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JUSTICE GORSUCH’S CHOICE:  
FROM BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY TO 
DOBBS V. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Marc Spindelman* 
The Supreme Court’s decision to take up Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization—the Mississippi case involving a law banning 
abortions after 15 weeks—likely foreshadows ominous news for 
reproductive rights.1 The most probable reason for the Court to consider 
the constitutionality of this measure is to approve it and, in doing so, to 
cut back on or overturn Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and what it 
preserved of Roe v. Wade.2 Supporters of reproductive rights are thus as 
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1. 2021 WL 1951792 (May 17, 2021); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d
265, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussing the Mississippi law being challenged in the case). 
2. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). For thoughtful commentary in these general directions, see Linda Greenhouse, The 
Free Ride May Soon Be Over for Anti-Abortion Politicians, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/Supreme-Court-abortion.html (“Do I think the court 
will use this case to permit states to ban abortion entirely? No, not directly and not this soon; there’s 
no need for the new majority, handpicked for that very purpose, to go that far this fast.”); Leah Litman 
& Melissa Murray, The Supreme Court’s Conservative Supermajority Is About to Show Us its True 
Colors, WASH. POST (May 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/17/supreme-court-mississippi-abortion-
restrictions-roe-v-wade  (“[I]t would not be unthinkable for this Supreme Court to use the Mississippi 
case to jettison Roe and Casey. . . . Even in cases where the court has not overruled past decisions, it 
has gone to herculean lengths to limit prior cases, broadly refashioning entire areas of law without 
explicitly overruling the decisions undergirding those doctrines.”); Mary Ziegler, Abortion Is Legal 
Until a Fetus Is Viable. Will the Supreme Court Change That Standard?, WASH. POST (May 18, 
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/18/scotus-abortion-rights/ (“The Supreme 
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right to worry about Dobbs as supporters of the right to life are to feel 
hopeful about it. As everyone awaits developments in the case, a 
possibility—capable of reconfiguring the entire landscape—dwells in an 
unlikely place: last year’s blockbuster LGBT Title VII sex discrimination 
ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County.3 
Preserving Casey and Roe in Dobbs will require at least two of the 
Court’s conservative justices to join the Court’s three remaining liberals. 
Chief Justice John Roberts did that last year in June Medical Services, 
L.L.C. v. Russo, the Court’s last major abortion rights case.4 The Chief 
Justice’s swing-vote concurrence in June Medical embraced the Court’s 
Casey ruling, with its reaffirmation of Roe’s “essential holding,” 
including the rule that the abortion decision is finally the pregnant 
woman’s to make prior to fetal viability, around 24 weeks.5 Everyone on 
the level agrees Mississippi’s 15-week abortion ban flouts Casey and its 
understanding of Roe’s rules.6 
Court’s decision to take what is unquestionably the biggest abortion case in decades is being greeted 
as an existential threat to Roe v. Wade[.] . . . But even if Roe isn’t entirely overturned, the justices 
could still hand a huge victory to the antiabortion movement by targeting the linchpin of abortion 
rights jurisprudence: the viability standard.”). For additional commentary astutely engaging the larger, 
current moment for abortion rights, see David J. Garrow, The Right to Abortion and the Bush-Trump 
Federal Courts, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 1, 2021), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-right-to-
abortion-and-bush-trump.html. For some historical perspective on the current situation, offered with 
Dobbs in view, see generally Earl M. Maltz, We Have Been Here Before: Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and the Survival of Abortion Rights, SSRN.COM, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3850724.  
3. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
4. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing Roe’s “essential holding”). An account of Chief Justice 
John Roberts’ June Medical concurrence as embracing Casey is in Marc Spindelman, Embracing 
Casey: June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo and the Constitutionality of Reason-Based Abortion 
Bans, 109 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 115 (2020). For views along similar lines, see Garrow, supra note 2 
(describing Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical as being “of potentially momentous 
importance,” and listing first among the reasons why that “he explicitly declares that ‘under principles 
of stare decisis’. . . I would adhere to the holding of Casey”), and Laurence H. Tribe, Roberts’s 
Approach Could End Up Being More Protective of Abortion Rights–Not Less, WASH. POST (July 1, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/01/robertss-approach-could-end-up-
being-more-protective-abortion-rights-not-less/ (“Although some advocates of abortion rights fear 
that the chief justice’s approach will open the door to other restrictions on abortion, I believe that 
Roberts’s analysis, correctly applied, could end of being more protective of abortion rights, not less.”). 
For the viability line being around 24 weeks, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (“The soundness or 
unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at . . . 23 to 
24 weeks, as it sometimes does today[.]”), and see also Obstetric Care Consensus, 130 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY e187, e188–89, e192 (2017) (24 weeks). 
6. Mississippi is quite clear on this in the merit brief it has filed in Dobbs, arguing first and
foremost that Roe should be overturned. Brief for Petitioners at 12–38, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (July 22, 2021) [hereinafter Dobbs Petitioners’ Brief]. 
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Informed speculation indicates that even if Chief Justice Roberts 
joins the Court’s remaining liberals in Dobbs, no other justice will. As 
prediction, this may well prove right. While Casey and Roe’s shared fate 
may thus already be sealed, Bostock indicates it should not be. The Court’s 
decision in the case provides reasons sounding in women’s equal 
citizenship and rule of law values for thinking that its author—Justice Neil 
Gorsuch—might, as a matter of principle, supply the additional vote 
needed to recommit the Court to Casey and Roe.7 
I. BOSTOCK’S VINDICATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Bostock Court confidently 
announces that its holding—that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are 
sex discrimination outlawed by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—
follows from a “straightforward application of legal terms with plain and 
settled meanings.”8 On its surface, this textualist opinion does not address 
constitutional abortion protections, nor, indeed, constitutional rights of 
any sort.9 Yet even as it explains that the “plain” terms of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination ban “necessarily” entail a bar against anti-gay and anti-
trans discrimination, the new reality that Bostock delivers to LGBT 
workers is built atop a powerful foundation of women’s workplace 
equality under law.10 
Amidst and beyond its textualist positions, Bostock repeatedly 
confirms its interpretive work against Title VII sex discrimination rulings 
that ground women’s workplace rights and structure Title VII’s sex 
7. Some believe that Justice Brett Kavanaugh is as—or more—likely than Justice Gorsuch to 
provide this fifth vote to affirm Casey and Roe, particularly given his dissent in June Medical Services 
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), the most moderate of the conservative justices’ dissents 
delivered in the case. Thinking along these lines is in keeping with the idea that Justice Kavanaugh 
has “replaced Roberts as the ideological midpoint of the court.” Nina Totenberg & Eric Singerman, 
The Supreme Court’s Term Appeared to Be Cautious. The Numbers Tell a Different Story, NPR.ORG 
(July 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/09/1013951873/the-supreme-courts-term-appeared-to-
be-cautious-the-numbers-tell-a-different-sto?s=03.  Where Justice Amy Coney Barrett is expected to 
come out in Dobbs is not based on any position she has expressed in a high profile abortion rights 
case at the Supreme Court. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743. 
9. For a close scrub of Bostock that traces its underlying constitutional energies and its rule
of law extensions, and that deals with its broad, but not categorical, elision of the Supreme Court’s 
pro-LGBT constitutional rights decisions, see generally Marc Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox: 
Textualism, Legal Justice, and the Constitution, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 553 (2021). 
10. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (“plain”), id. at 1742 (“necessarily”), id. at 1744 (same), id. at 
1745 (same), id. at 1747 (same). For Bostock’s main textualist account of itself, see id. at 1738–43. 
For some of the Court’s discussion of aspects of the foundations of women’s workplace equality under 
the statute, see id. at 1743–44. Other passages are noted infra note 11. 
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discrimination guarantees.11 In reaching its pro-LGBT conclusions, 
Bostock decisively rejects defense arguments that, in theory, were 
inconsistent with, and thus threatened, established sex discrimination 
protections, notably rules against sexual harassment and motherhood 
discrimination.12 Reaffirming these anti-discrimination protections, 
Bostock continues Title VII’s tradition of safeguarding cisheterosexual 
women’s opportunities to work and earn a living on terms cisheterosexual 
men have long enjoyed. In the process, all of these individuals are made 
more nearly equal at work—and in the remainder of social life.13 These 
sex equality positions point the way from Bostock to a pro-choice ruling 
in Dobbs. 
II. BOSTOCK’S ALIGNMENT WITH ABORTION RIGHTS
Without discussing abortion rights, Bostock aligns with important 
ideas about them offered by the controlling opinion in Casey. Coauthored 
11. See, e.g., id. at 1738–39 (“[W]e orient ourselves to the time of the statute’s adoption, here 
1964, and begin by examining the key statutory terms in turn before assessing their impact on the 
cases at hand and then confirming our work against this Court’s precedents.”); id. at 1743 (“If more 
support . . . were required, there’s no need to look far. All that the statute’s plain terms suggest, this 
Court’s cases have already confirmed.”). Even within Bostock’s assessment of the statute’s “plain” 
meaning, precedent is part of the Court’s analysis. See id. at 1739–41. Passages in which Bostock 
looks to the Court’s established sex discrimination rules include id. at 1741 (citing Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion)); id. at 1743–48 (discussing case law
including Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), Los Angeles Dep’t of 
Water &  Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
523 U.S. 75 (1998)); id. at 1746 (discussing Phillips); id. at 1746–47 (discussing sexual harassment 
and motherhood discrimination); id. at 1748 (discussing legality of “gender role[]” stereotyping); id. 
at 1749 (citing Oncale); id. at 1751–52 (same); id. at 1752 (discussing Phillips and sexual harassment 
law developments “by the late 1970s”). 
12. See, e.g., id. at 1746–47 (discussing the implications of anti-LGBT arguments mounted in 
the case for the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination precedents and 
rhetorically asking, then answering: “Would the employers have us reverse those cases on the theory 
that Congress could have spoken to those problems more specifically? Of course not.”). See also 
supra note 11 for other textual passages discussing sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination. 
13. For some important reflections on the dynamic relationship between the Court’s Title VII
sex discrimination rules and its constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence, see, for example, 
Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 765, 766 
(2002) (“[T]he development of the constitutional law of sex discrimination was path dependent, but 
not, as I see it, principally on constitutional race-discrimination law, [but] instead on the statutory law 
of sex discrimination arising out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It is thus path dependent 
on exactly what . . . American law traditionally holds back from, to wit governmental intervention 
into private discrimination[.]”), and Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36–37 
(1995) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s approach in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989), as coordinated to the Court’s sex stereotyping doctrine found “throughout its modern 
constitutional and statutory sex discrimination jurisprudence”).  
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by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter, 
the Casey joint opinion rededicated the Court to Roe’s “essential holding” 
in meaningful respects because the abortion right that it recognized helped 
to ensure women’s control over their bodies and their destinies.14 Casey’s 
formal ruling on constitutional liberty highlighted liberty’s equality 
dimensions, vindicating what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called 
women’s “equal citizenship stature,” and what the Casey joint opinion 
described as “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation.”15 Both Bostock and Casey already rest 
within this larger legal framework. 
If Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock meshes with Casey in these 
ways, suggesting a potential shared future in Dobbs, a counter-indication 
to that prospect surfaced last year in June Medical. Dissenting there and 
voting to uphold the Louisiana anti-abortion law that the Court’s majority 
held inconsistent with Casey and Roe, Justice Gorsuch’s June Medical 
opinion said some ominous things about constitutional abortion rights—
arguably pointing toward their elimination.16 
14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing Roe’s “essential holding”); id. at 856 (“The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 852 (characterizing “the abortion decision” as 
“originat[ing] within the zone of conscience and belief”); id. (“Her suffering is too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however 
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny of the woman must 
be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in 
society.”). Incisive engagement with Casey’s sex equality analytics in the context of lesbian and gay 
rights as elaborated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), is in Catharine A. MacKinnon, The 
Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1081, 1088 (2004). 
15. For Justice Ginsburg’s expression, see Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not 
seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”). See also Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1287–88 (2003) (discussing “equal 
citizenship stature for men and women” and tracing the idea, in part, to  Justice Byron White’s dissent 
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 361 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)). For the relevant language from 
Casey, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. Accord id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic 
equality of men and women.”). For more on Justice Ginsburg’s thinking about equal citizenship 
stature, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s 
Constitutional Vision, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799 (2009). For other points in Casey shoring up its 
sense of “what Roe has meant for the ability of women to live according to their own goals and 
values,” Christina B. Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1980, 1984 (2002), see Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 855–56, 860–68, 887–98. 
16. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2171, 2181–82 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (offering an aerial
vision and snapshot of the trajectory of the opinion’s argument against the results reached by the 
Court in the case). For passages in the opinion that arguably run against the grain of existing 
constitutional protections for the abortion right, see id. at 2171–79. 
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Still, the dissent did not slam the door shut on abortion rights. It 
might easily have done so, either in its own terms or by indicating its 
agreement with the calls in Justice Clarence Thomas’s June Medical 
dissent for Roe to be overturned.17 By contrast, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion 
stressed early on that Roe was “not even at issue here,” and later critiqued 
the Chief Justice’s June Medical concurrence for its “discontinuity with 
Casey,” digging into rules from Casey that Justice Gorsuch believed 
should have been followed but were not.18 
Justice Gorsuch’s June Medical dissent ended with a lament that the 
Court had “lost [its] way.”19 Not strictly a comment on Casey and Roe, 
the opinion intimated that the Court could—and should—rediscover its 
path by a ruling in a future case reestablishing faith with “the neutral 
principles that normally govern the judicial process,” presumably 
including strict adherence to Casey’s longstanding rules and what they 
kept of Roe.20 In these ways at least, the dissent held space for a more 
thoroughgoing embrace of Casey and Roe in a case like Dobbs. 
To occupy this space may be thought to require Justice Gorsuch to 
soften, if not modify, his position on constitutional abortion rights.21 
Bostock shows the openness of his judicial process, but in ways that 
Dobbs may test. 
During oral arguments in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. 
v. EEOC, one of the cases that Bostock collects and that centered on
whether anti-trans discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII, 
Justice Gorsuch voiced concerns about whether interpreting Title VII in 
pro-trans ways would yield a “drastic . . . change” or a “massive social 
upheaval.”22 Justice Gorsuch’s expression of these concerns seemed to 
17. Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our abortion precedents are grievously wrong and
should be overruled.”); see also id. at 2149–53 (elaborating the argument for the conclusion that “[t]he 
Constitution does not constrain the State’s ability to regulate or even prohibit abortion. . . . [T]he 
putative right to abortion is a creation that should be undone”). Thanks to Mary Ziegler for 
conversation on this aspect of June Medical and on the larger point. 
18. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2171, 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2182 (“lost our way”). The larger discussion is in id. at 2181–82. 
20. Id. at 2182. Of course, if “the neutral principles that normally govern the judicial process” 
are the touchstone for judgment in Dobbs, it is difficult to see how they would be furthered, much 
less honored, by a decision attacking the viability standard that has been in place since Roe governing 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional review of abortion regulations. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–
65 (explaining the significance of the viability line). 
21. Cf. Tribe, supra note 5 (noting that June Medical was the Chief Justice’s “first vote against 
an abortion restriction,” and discussing the significance of the opinion and its prospects). 
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, 26, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. 
EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_4gcj.pdf     (statements of Justice Gorsuch). For the larger 
exchange, see id. at 23–28. 
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confirm already-circulating assumptions about his opposition to LGBT 
rights. On hearing them, many felt even more confident that he would 
reject the pro-trans position in the case, and maybe the pro-gay positions 
in the other cases argued the same day.23 
When David Cole, the American Civil Liberties Union attorney 
representing Aimee Stephens, the trans plaintiff in Harris Funeral Homes, 
met Justice Gorsuch’s concerns head-on, he reminded him that, although 
lower courts had recognized trans sex discrimination rights for decades, 
those decisions had precipitated no drastic change or massive social 
upheaval.24 The lack of any such response suggested that judicial and 
social experiences with trans sex equality under Title VII law posed no 
obstacle to what was otherwise a principled, pro-trans outcome in the 
case, based on the standard textualist interpretive protocols that were the 
main focus of Cole’s advocacy on Stephens’s behalf.25 
Judging from the Bostock opinion, Cole’s reassurances worked. 
Without dwelling in thoughts of social disruption, Bostock proudly 
presents itself as a “simple and momentous” ruling for LGBT workers and 
their rights.26 Happily, too, as Cole predicted, Bostock has caused no 
social uproar. The flurry of anti-trans legislative activity in its wake is 
depressing, but a wholly predictable effort in retrenchment seeking to 
circumscribe Bostock’s ripple effects.27 Like other post-Bostock LGBT 
rights developments, these measures have already started being processed 
by a judiciary that has heard—and is generally following—Bostock’s 
trumpet for LGBT equality under law.28 
23. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38 (discussing the cases involving Gerald Bostock and
Donald Zarda). 
24. Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 22, at 27 (statement of David D. Cole)
(“[F]ederal courts of appeals have been recognizing that discrimination against transgender people is 
sex discrimination for 20 years. There’s been no upheaval.”). 
25. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 3–4, 15–16, 20–27, 36–40, R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107) (noting the arguments from 
statutory text favoring Stephens’s position). 
26. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“The statute’s message for our cases is . . . simple and
momentous.”). What thoughts of disruption there are in Bostock, particularly legal disruption, cut 
against defense positions in the case. For some examples, see id. at 1747 (discussing implications of 
defense arguments for sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination rules), id. at 1751 
(describing defense arguments as “pro[ving] too much,” because, if accepted, “we’d have more than 
a little law to overturn”); id. at 1753 (discussing defense concerns about the “sweep” of the majority 
opinion) 
27. For one report on the recent flurry of anti-trans legislative activity, see David Crary, No 
Big Backlash for States Passing Anti-Transgender Laws, APNEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2021), 
https://apnews.com/article/us-news-health-laws-legislature-bills-5726fdeb8a5e7cf2c89
a4a2d176e8a7f  
28. For some of the pro-LGBT legal actions and decisions in Bostock’s wake, see 
Spindelman, supra note 9, at 609 n.180, 610–11 n.182, and Robert Barnes & Hannah Natanson, 
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While Justice Gorsuch’s concerns about the social impacts of a pro-
trans ruling in Harris Funeral Homes were resolved by the time Bostock 
came out, his decision to express them as part of his deliberative process 
was important and telling. The remarks show Justice Gorsuch’s judicial 
mindset in action, and how salient to it rule of law ideas about social 
stability are—ideas that are among the rule of law values avowed 
textualists like Justice Gorsuch have relied on to justify their interpretive 
methodology and its results.29 Overshadowed by Bostock’s textualist 
formalism, Justice Gorsuch’s questions in Harris Funeral Homes 
indicated a recognition, itself grounded in the rule of law, that judging and 
the judicial process, particularly in momentous cases that may operate in 
unpredictable and socially disruptive ways, are complex and dynamic, not 
mechanical, affairs.30 Nowhere may artfulness in judicial decision-
making be more necessary than in cases involving the already super-
heated waters of culture war politics that have so long and forcefully 
swirled around women’s and LGBT rights.31 
Supreme Court Will Not Hear Transgender Bathroom Rights Dispute, a Win for Va. Student Who 
Sued His School for Discrimination, WASH. POST (June 28, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-transgender-bathroom-gavin-
grimm/2021/06/28/e51b47e6-d815-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html. For a recent decision on 
new anti-trans legislation that builds on Bostock, see, for example B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2021 WL 3081883, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. July 21, 2021) (citing Bostock 
and Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. School Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020), in granting a preliminary 
injunction to a transgender athlete against the state’s “Save Women’s Sports Bill”). See also Brandt 
v. Rutledge, No. 4:21-CV-00450, 2021 WL 3292057 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 2, 2021) (granting 
preliminary injunction against a law banning gender-affirming treatment for transgender minors). 
29. See, e.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 47, 55–56 (2019)
(“[W]hen judges pull from the same toolbox and look to the same materials to answer the same narrow 
question—What might a reasonable person have thought the law was at the time?—we confine the 
range of possible outcomes and provide a remarkably stable and predictable set of rules people are 
able to follow. And even when a hard case does arise, once it’s decided it takes on the force of 
precedent, becomes and easy case in the future, and contributes further to the determinacy of our 
law.”); id. at 57 (“Lawyers seek to make judgments about the future based on a set of reasonably 
stable existing rules; they do so with a respect for and in light of the law as it is. This is not politics; 
that is the ancient and honorable practice of law.”). For more on Bostock as a rule of law decision 
grounded in principles of legal equality or legal justice, see generally Spindelman, supra note 9. 
30. GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 189, 195 (“Of course, there are some truly hard cases, plenty 
of them. And judging is more of an art than some mechanical science always yielding a single 
obviously right answer.”). 
31. Commentary from across the viewpoint spectrum debunks the impulse to think that Roe v. 
Wade precipitated the “culture wars” around abortion rights, and that, consequently, a decision 
overturning Casey and Roe would settle them back down. Sources in this vein include GENE BURNS, 
THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL PLURALISMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 150– 206 (2005); BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION 
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING ix–x, 1–116, 253, 256–59 (Linda Greenhouse & 
Reva Siegel eds., 2010); DAN WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 1–197 (2015); MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE 
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Rule of law ideas and ideals about social stability may not figure 
prominently and in so many words in Bostock’s official rationale, but their 
place in the record forges its own link to Casey and its conviction that rule 
of law stability fears were urgent enough in the abortion setting to help 
drive it to reconfirm Roe’s basics.32 Casey honored the foundation of 
constitutional abortion rights not only because of the meaning of equality-
inflected liberty under the Constitution, but also because of the far-
reaching social upheaval it understood overturning Roe would produce 
across multiple axes of law and social life.33 When stability returns as a 
decisional yardstick in Dobbs, Bostock suggests that Justice Gorsuch will 
seriously consider it. It is among the reasons Bostock tees up for him to 
claim the space that his June Medical opinion left open for a decision 
reaffirming Casey and Roe. 
III. CASEY’S TEACHINGS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND
JUDICIAL MODERATION 
Whether these prospects will actually materialize in Dobbs depends 
partly on whether Justice Gorsuch follows Bostock’s pro-women’s-equal-
citizenship and rule of law thinking in the new case. No less significantly, 
their materialization will depend on whether the various resonances 
between Bostock and Casey impel Justice Gorsuch to engage in a more 
searching reflection on the Casey joint opinion’s teachings—teachings he 
ABORTION DEBATE 186–218 (2015); MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. 
WADE TO THE PRESENT 6, 13–20, 208–10 (2020). I thank Mary Ziegler for introducing me to some 
of these materials. On the deeper connections between cis women’s rights as women’s rights and 
LGBT rights, they can be lined up doctrinally, as through the right to privacy or constitutional liberty 
guarantees, or along the lines suggested by Bostock as dimensions of larger sex equality concerns. 
Perspective on one recent major development, described in Dave Montgomery & Edgar Sandoval, 
Near-Complete Ban on Abortion Is Signed Into Law in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/us/texas-abortion-law.html, is found in Laurence H. Tribe & 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Texas Tries to Upend the Legal System With Its Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 
19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/opinion/texas-abortion-law-reward.html.  
32. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (raising the prospect that overturning Roe would produce 
“serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the society governed by 
it”); id. at 869 (“A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would 
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s 
legitimacy and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to 
the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.”). 
33. Discussion of various examples is found in Casey, id. at 846–69, id. at 869–78 (opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.), and id. at 901 (opinion of the Court). 
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already knows, but that may reveal new facets as the pressures in Dobbs 
put its survival both on the line and in his hands.34 
Casey’s instructions have significant doctrinal dimensions. Casey 
acknowledged that, in the years since Roe, it had become an integral part 
of the Court’s understanding of constitutional liberty, one that should 
persist.35 Eliminating Roe—as now with Casey itself—was understood as 
needlessly and problematically destabilizing to the Court’s larger line of 
liberty cases.36 This series now includes the Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights decisions, which Bostock, without herald, indeed, 
without expressly citing them, elevates to new heights.37 Notably for 
Justice Gorsuch’s developing jurisprudence, striking at abortion rights in 
Dobbs would diminish the wider constitutional context of women’s and 
LGBT constitutional liberties, which together reinforce Bostock’s 
textualist handiwork. 
34. Aside from his opinion in June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), which 
discusses Casey, see NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 8–11, 
14–15, 18, 39, 77–82, 84, 216, 255 n.10 (2017), which also does. 
35. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”); 
id. at 847–48 (discussing the Court’s privacy cases and noting that they have “vindicated” “a realm 
of personal liberty which the government may not enter”); id. at 849 (discussing the Court’s privacy 
cases); id. at 851 (discussing the Court’s privacy cases and quoting the promise from Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972), that the Constitution protects “the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); id. at 852–53 (noting the relationship of Roe 
to “the decision to use contraception” protected by decisions whose “correctness” Casey indicates it 
does not “doubt”); id. at 869 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“We conclude that the 
basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.”); id. at 
898 (opinion of the Court) (“If a husband’s interest in the potential life of the child outweighs a wife’s 
liberty, the State could require a married woman to notify her husband before she uses a 
postfertilization contraceptive.”). 
36. For different expressions, see, for example, Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53 (discussing Roe’s 
relationship to the Court’s earlier right to privacy cases); 855–57 (discussing various reliance interests 
and indicating different doctrinal lines that Roe intersects with). For some additional historical 
context, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) (No. 88-605) (“[W]e are not asking the Court to unravel the fabric of unenumerated and 
privacy rights which this Court has woven in cases like Meyer and Pierce and Moore and Griswold. 
Rather, we are asking the Court to pull this one thread.”) (remarks by Charles Fried, Special Assistant 
to the Attorney General), but see id. at 26-27 (“It has always been my personal experience that when 
I pull a thread, my sleeve falls off. There is no stopping. . . . It is the full range of procreational rights 
and choices. . . .”) (remarks by Frank Susman, for the Appellees). The challenges of selectively 
pulling the abortion rights thread from the Court’s constitutional privacy, or liberty, decisions is all 
the more challenging in the present tense, as noted in the text, because of the Court’s expansion of 
those decisions to encompass LGBT rights in the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights 
jurisprudence. 
37. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The relationship of these cases to Bostock, 
including their formal elision in the Court’s opinion, which is not so perfect as at first glance it might 
appear, is explored in Spindelman, supra note 9. 
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What is more, if Dobbs ends up clawing back abortion rights—no 
matter how many times they have been reaffirmed and served as building 
blocks for other decisions—it would not only be cases decided in the 
Constitution’s open textures of liberty that would be punctuated by a new 
question mark. Counterintuitively, an anti-abortion ruling in Dobbs—
establishing the legal conditions for stripping Americans of individual 
rights that have persisted for generations—could become the very 
precedent that another Court might someday use to stop or roll back 
conservative constitutional rights that are now being recognized by the 
Court.38 Such is the double-edged nature of constitutional principle. 
Doctrine aside, Casey’s approach to judicial decision-making is an 
example of the once-esteemed art and practice of judicial moderation. The 
Casey joint opinion presented itself as an attempt to respect the balance 
of opposing interests in the case in a way that reflected the hope that, if 
done well, the balance might hold going forward, because it would foster 
and reinforce a wider spirit of practical accommodation and compromise 
in abortion politics.39 By recalibrating the abortion right through not-
insignificant enhancements of its limits—limits that afforded right-to-life 
views and values greater room to hold sway over the abortion decision 
within the constitutional framework that it announced—the Casey joint 
38. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 141
S. Ct. 1294 (2021). For other rights that might be at stake, see also, for example, New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Corlett, 2021 WL 1602643 (Apr. 26, 2021). See also Brendan Pierson, 
How COVID and Shadow Docket Exploded SCOTUS’s Scope of Religious Freedom, REUTERS.COM 
(June 17, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/how-covid-shadow-docket-exploded-
scotus-scope-religious-freedom-2021-06-16/. 
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866–67 (“Where . . . the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve 
the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe . . ., its decision has a dimension that the 
resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their 
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”). See also Yale 
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide – Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 768 
(1995) (explaining, in the context of an argument rejecting a broad constitutional right to assisted 
suicide, that “[a]ll things considered, I believe the Court that reaffirmed Roe in 1992 was bent on 
bringing an old constitutional war to an end—not preparing to fight a new one,” and thereby 
distinguishing Casey from pro-assisted suicide claims). Cf. also GORSUCH, ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra 
note 34, at 80–81 (2006) (“Similarly, it may well be the case that, in time, Casey may come to be 
dominantly read as a stare decisis decision—a ruling, in essence, that we must respect the abortion 
right out of traditional deference to settled law—rather than creating any new, open-ended right to 
‘define one’s concept of existence.’ . . . How far Casey’s ‘reasoned judgment’ analysis might be 
extended thus very much remains to be seen.”). Sharp and still timely analysis of Justice Gorsuch’s 
views on assisted suicide and euthanasia and how they might play out in the abortion setting is in 
Amy Howe, Gorsuch on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide–And Abortion?, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Mar. 
16, 2017), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/gorsuch-euthanasia-assisted-suicide-abortion/. 
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opinion figured a constitutional consensus position that it believed people 
of good faith, with very different abortion commitments, might accept.40 
Now regarded as a failed attempt in turning political enemies into 
friends, Casey chose its path while understanding that the alternative—
returning abortion to the political arena on ordinary terms—would almost 
certainly fan the flames of already-burning culture war politics.41 Casey’s 
sightline included the prospects that the passionate commitments of anti-
abortion positions could easily drag the Court back into the constitutional 
fray.42 Among the reasons: abortion might be outlawed without adequate 
provision for women’s life and health, in cases of rape or incest, through 
pro-life state constitutional amendments that choke off ordinary political 
channels for legal reform, or—scarcely unthinkably—because pro-life 
forces have long envisioned the Court announcing a pro-life interpretation 
of the Constitution that would outlaw efforts to make abortion legal.43 
40. For Casey’s enhancement of the limits of the abortion right, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–
79 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). For the bid to consensus, see, for example, id. 
at 867 (opinion of the Court) (noting constitutional interpretations designed to “call[] the contending 
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted 
in the Constitution”). 
41. For a contrary position, see Dobbs Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 6, at 23 (suggesting that
“any real compromise on the hard issue of abortion” will only arrive after Roe and Casey are 
overturned); id. at 24 (“The national fever on abortion can break only when this Court returns abortion 
policy to the States—where agreement is more common, compromise is often possible, and 
disagreement can be resolved at the ballot box.”). Some will undoubtedly find the idea of compromise 
being possible only after Roe and Casey are overturned difficult to track in the context of Dobbs, 
particularly given Mississippi’s uncompromising position on abortion rights in its merits brief and as 
reflected in the state law at issue in the case. 
42. For some perspective on some of the likely patterned effects of a decision overturning
Casey, see, for example, Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 47–82 (2018) 
(discussing abortion and poverty); Clare Huntington, Book Review, Abortion Talk, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
1043, 1052 (2019) (reviewing Carol Sanger, About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in Twenty-
First-Century America (2017)) (same). See also generally Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Book Review, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270 (2018) (reviewing Khiara M. 
Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights (2017)). Related, intersecting effects are also powerfully 
described in Michele Goodwin, Banning Abortion Doesn’t Protect Women’s Health, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2021),  https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/opinion/roe-abortion-supreme-court.html  
(“Black women bear the brunt of reproductive politicking in the United States.”). 
43. For one report on an early-term, previability abortion ban that contains no exceptions for
cases of rape or incest, see Jason Breslow & Sarah McCammon, The Governor of Texas Has Signed 
a Law That Bans Abortion as Early as Six Weeks, NPR.ORG (May 19, 2021), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/05/19/998237349/the-governor-of-texas-has-signed-a-law-that-bans-
abortion-as-early-as-6-weeks (noting the law “make no exceptions for pregnancies that are the result 
of rape or incest”). The pro-life wish for a Supreme Court decision announcing a pro-life 
interpretation of the Constitution has recently been discussed in Mary Ziegler, The Abortion Fight 
Has Never Been About Just Roe v. Wade, THE ATLANTIC (May 20, 2021), at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/abortion-fight-roe-v-wade/618930/. For some 
relevant thoughts on state law patterning of abortion law should Casey and Roe be overturned, 
consider GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 286, 288 (“Justice [Byron] White . . . argued that the Court had 
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A sober judicial assessment of the political upheavals potentially 
associated with a decision overturning Roe might thus have suggested to 
the justices whose views carried the day in Casey that the Court’s 
permanent exit from involvement in the constitutional management of 
abortion rights was a pipedream, and a pipedream with steep costs for 
liberty, equality, and the rule of law.44 Accepting that reality, which does 
not at all overlook how pro-choice, reproductive justice forces would 
respond to such developments, perhaps in the direction of pursuing a new 
Roe, the steadiest and surest way forward may have seemed—and may 
remain—Casey’s path, trying, however imperfectly, to find an idealized 
consensus point for the Court to hold fast to when applying the rules Casey 
announced. 
As between the stark alternatives of staying Roe’s course or 
retreating from it entirely, Casey broke toward the middle path of a “Pax 
Roeana.”45 It did so not because its own head was in the clouds, but 
because that path was illuminated by a perspective that was itself 
informed by conservative, rule of law preferences for legal and social 
stability, respect for settled decisions and principled decision-making, and 
a sense that Roe’s basics, even if Roe was initially wrongly decided, 
conduced to modern-day understandings of women’s liberty and equality 
in society and under law, if with limits.46 In Casey’s estimation, these all 
were values befitting the Supreme Court as a rule of law institution to 
respect while issuing its constitutional judgment in the case.47 
an obligation to take and resolve these disagreements so that people in one part of the country weren’t 
treated differently from those elsewhere only because of the happenstance of geography.”). This 
patterning might be reinforced through legal rules regulating interstate travel to procure an abortion. 
44. See supra note 32.
45. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). 
46. Id. at 868 (opinion of the Court) (“The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker
for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not 
changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete.”); id. at 865 (framing an explanation 
for “why overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under 
principles of stare decisis, but would [also] seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the 
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law”); id. at 
874 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).  
47. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (opinion of the Court) (“A decision to overrule Roe’s
essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost 
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment 
to the rule of law.”). 
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IV. THE SPIRITUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CASEY’S
SPIRIT OF MODERATION 
From one perspective, Casey’s middle path is a conventional liberty-
based constitutional ruling that respects women’s liberty and advances 
women’s equal citizenship stature by broadly freeing abortion from 
religious and moral condemnations of it expressed through law. Casey 
fosters and reinforces this impression of itself when it comments that: 
“Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation 
is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”48 In 
saying this, Casey indicates it is not issuing a morality-based, anti-
abortion ruling in the case. This is true as far as it goes, but it does not tell 
the whole story. No sooner does Casey relinquish morality as a touchstone 
for an anti-abortion ruling than it embraces a spiritual outlook that 
animates the reasoning it offers and the conclusions it reaches, and could 
yet again in Dobbs. 
Casey’s spiritual outlook is on display—hidden in plain sight—in 
one of the joint opinion’s most memorable and infamous expressions. 
Casey locates the abortion decision within “the heart of [constitutional] 
liberty,” which, it says, is “the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life.”49 
Involving these higher matters, abortion, on this view, is spiritually 
driven, expressed in liberal terms through decision and choice. 
Casey elaborates this idea as it proceeds. Indeed, in its very next 
paragraph, Casey explains: 
[T]hough the abortion decision may originate within the zone of con-
science and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a 
unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the 
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the per-
sons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, 
and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures 
exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against 
innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or po-
tential life that is aborted. Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow 
that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because 
48. Id. at 850.
49. Id. at 851. For a thoughtful effort that traces the “underground establishment clause” in the 
Court’s abortion cases, including Casey, see Justin Murray, Exposing the Underground Establishment 
Clause in the Supreme Court’s Abortion Cases, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2010). See also id. at 3–4 
n.8 (collecting sources discussing abortion’s relationship to religion and the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses). 
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the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human con-
dition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full 
term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human 
race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes 
of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds 
for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate 
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of 
the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course 
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped 
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and 
her place in society.50 
The bookends here express the crucial features of Casey’s spiritual 
perspective on the case’s stakes. “[T]he abortion decision[,] originat[ing] 
within the zone of conscience and belief” and impacting “the woman’s 
[social] role,” “must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of 
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society[.]”51 The decision 
whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term and to become a mother 
emerges from, and so involves, spiritual grounds. 
Understood in these terms, Casey’s middle way does not simply cut 
a path between women’s autonomous decision-making, on the one hand, 
and conservative religious and traditional moral views and values, on the 
other. That is how Casey ultimately expresses the point as its 
constitutional conclusion, but before it does so, Casey’s spiritual framing 
indicates the abortion conflict implicates a clash of spiritual positions that, 
for purposes of this constitutional decision at least, are on the same 
plane.52 
Casey’s exercise of judicial moderation is thus a stylized expression 
of a deeper spiritual perspective that refuses to hold any one spiritual 
50. Id. at 852. For more along these lines, see id. 850 (“Men and women of good conscience
can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual 
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earlierst stages”); id. at 853 (discussing the 
“wonder of creation”). See also, e.g., id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“As the joint opinion so eloquently demonstrates, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is 
nothing less than a matter of conscience.”); id. at 919 (“A woman who has, in the privacy of her 
thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her decision cannot be forced to reconsider 
all, simply because the State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.”). 
51. Id. at 852.
52. Attuned to this, Casey’s readers may appreciate subtleties of expression that could
otherwise be easily missed, as when the opinion talks about “[m]en and women of good conscience” 
disagreeing with one another “about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stages.” Id. at 850. Moral and spiritual perspectives in the locution 
exhaust the universe of values Casey implicates at its own heart.  
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stance on abortion—for or against it—above any other. Casey’s approach 
to the conflict in the case is, accordingly, spiritually moderate and modest, 
as well as spiritually pluralistic. Paying equal respects to the different 
spiritual expressions the case involves, both pro-choice and pro-life 
people of “good conscience” receive decisional jurisdiction over part of 
women’s pregnancies with fetal viability—inherited from Roe and 
preserved for the reasons Casey explains—serving as the crucial 
jurisdictional boundary line.53 Not inviolable, this boundary is porous in 
rule-bound respects. Each spiritual perspective has some limited room to 
operate where the other generally reigns supreme.54 Prior to viability, 
where the spiritually-based choice whether to have an abortion is 
paramount, pro-life views and values may operate by seeking to 
persuade—but not coerce or force—a particular abortion decision.55 
Likewise, after viability, where pro-life religious and moral views and 
values hold sway, they must still yield where a pregnant woman’s life or 
health is at stake.56 In all of this there is a sense of a rule of law vision of 
equal justice that is in operation. According to it, women and men of good 
conscience are treated with the law’s equal respect and in roughly the 
same way. 
Recognizing this, Casey does not rest content with ensuring that 
women’s bodies and minds are not wholly overtaken by the state prior to 
fetal viability consistent with pro-life views and values—as imperative as 
that is in constitutional liberty terms. More fundamentally, Casey’s 
promises minister and safeguard women’s spiritual integrity and welfare, 
including their consciences and beliefs. Casey’s instruction is that these 
dimensions of women’s spiritual being must likewise be preserved intact, 
neither shattered nor negated before viability by pro-life anti-abortion 
laws that force women to travel a spiritual road not of their own free will.57 
53. See, e.g., id. at 861 (“[N]o changes of fact have rendered viability more or less appropriate 
as the point at which the balance of interests tips.”). For relevant discussion of viability in Casey, see 
id. at 860–61 (opinion of the Court), id. at 869–79 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
54. See, e.g., id. at 878–79 (summarizing holding).
55. Id. at 877 (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right 
to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect 
for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise 
of the right to choose.”).  
56. See, e.g., id. at 879 (opinion of the Court).
57. As the joint opinion puts it immediately after describing “the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”: “Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. For a different perspective on the relation of this freedom to the 
viability line, see id. at 870 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“In some broad sense 
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Formally for women’s benefit, this understanding reaches out to pro-life 
religious conservatives and traditional moralists. It is as if Casey, having 
already expressed fellowship, even identity, with them, says: We, of all 
people, must understand the importance of the state honoring the dignity 
and nobility of spiritual being and the sometimes mysterious movement 
of the spirit unto conscientious conviction and belief—even when the 
conclusions that another spirit reaches are profoundly at odds with our 
own. 
Not incidentally, Casey’s spiritual pluralism and the constitutional 
rules that it produces supply the elements required for a full reply to the 
famous charge that the “dictum” of its sweet-mystery-of-life passage is 
“the passage that ate the rule of law.”58 The accusation’s rhetorical 
delights paper over its own substantive excesses. The drama of its 
expression distracts from how Casey’s spiritual pluralism actually 
manifests in law-bound ways via its cross-cutting jurisdictional carve-ups. 
By its own terms, Casey conserves—it does not eat—the rule of law. 
In other terms, however, the charges against Casey’s mystery-of-life 
passage stick. The ridicule they heap on Casey’s spiritual outlook speaks 
to a recognizable outrage on the pro-life right about Casey’s equal legal 
treatment project and its ostensibly implied moral equivalence of abortion 
and religious and moral opposition to it. In this at least there is a certain 
convergence with the pro-choice left. For different reasons, progressive, 
pro-choice reactions to Casey’s spiritualizing are primed to see it as 
unwarranted statist evangelizing that figures women’s autonomous 
reasons and choices as spiritually grounded, whether they are or not. To 
make matters worse, this apparent affront to women’s capacities for 
rational, autonomous decision-making is not directed at—but rather 
past—them. Its overarching function is to offer a rationale that might 
persuade faithful conservatives and traditional moralists to accept the 
Court’s outcome in the case. 
Bostock resonates with some of these themes in its own way, 
especially when it trains its sights on existing sex discrimination 
protections against sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination. 
Bostock’s multiple invocations of these cases and their rules subtly give 
it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention 
on behalf of the developing child.”).  
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Court is referring
not to the holding of Casey, but to the dictum of its famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage . . . : That 
‘casts some doubt’ upon either the totality of our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer) 
nothing at all. . . . [I]f the passage calls into question the government’s power to regulation actions 
based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the passage that ate the rule of law.”). 
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off the impression that they are being conceived at least in part from 
within a traditionalist perspective that imagines sexuality, reproduction, 
parenting, and, distinctively, motherhood, as tied to higher moral purposes 
and ends. This understanding, broadly familiar within U.S. cultural 
traditions as Casey attests, corresponds with ideas that circulated in the 
cases Bostock collects, where the idea of “sex”—both as an attribute and 
an activity, sometimes with reproductive consequences—at times carried 
discernible religious undertones.59 
Against this backdrop, Bostock’s emphasis on sexual harassment and 
motherhood discrimination rules reads as an element of a judicial strategy 
meant to appeal to culturally conservative audiences by indicating that 
values they hold dear—around sexuality and motherhood—are not 
imperiled but affirmed by the decision, which otherwise  limits the scope 
of their religious and moral outlooks. A more prominent dimension of this 
strategy arrives in Bostock’s reassurances that its protections for LGBT 
workers will not in the future needlessly imperil religious rights.60 
Without exactly pursuing its own path of peace, Bostock seeks to calm the 
intensities of the opposing positions in the case in a way that loosely 
reflects Casey’s sensibility and that tracks its structure of recognizing 
conflicting rights and interests while reaching for modes of doctrinal 
accommodation. 
Bostock’s express affirmation of its own concerns with First 
Amendment free exercise rights and statutory protections against religious 
discrimination keep the Court from having to contemplate the prospect of 
redefining its sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination 
protections in traditionalist terms. That undertaking, which would have 
involved re-imagining Title VII’s rules in relation to traditionalist 
59. On Casey’s attestation, see supra text accompanying note 50. For some discussion of the
uses of the term “sex” in the cases that Bostock collects, see Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: 
A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87, 
91–92 n.14 (2020), and Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title 
VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 101, 105–06 & n.16 (2020). The 
sexual logics of aspects of the anti-trans position in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., v. 
EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107), are discussed generally in Spindelman, Shower’s Return, 
Part II, in Spindelman, Shower’s Return, Part III, and in Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A 
Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part IV, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 117 
(2020). 
60. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1733, 1753–54 (2020) (recognizing that, while
“the employers fear that complying with Title VII’s requirements in cases like ours may require some 
employers to violate their religious convictions[,]” “[w]e are also deeply concerned with preserving 
the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution; that guarantee lies at the 
heart of our pluralistic society,” and then going on to flag statutory protections for religious liberties 
that future cases might implicate).  
2021] JUSTICE GORSUCH’S CHOICE 29 
purposes, would anyway have conflicted with Bostock’s textualist 
commitments. Moreover, it would have contradicted Bostock’s broad 
understanding of sex discrimination rights for LGBT persons, newly 
afforded the right to be themselves at work. 
Recalling that LGBT rights in Bostock emerge from a legal 
framework guaranteeing cisheterosexual women anti-discrimination 
protections, Bostock’s meaning for their rights to be themselves must not 
be overlooked. As Bostock intimates, these rights include women’s 
individual control over sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood 
decisions. These decisions are only meaningful individual choices when 
liberated from the traditionalist ideas that, in “the course of our history 
and our culture,” have dominated them.61 If sexual harassment and 
motherhood discrimination rules now broadly carry equality-enhancing 
and liberty-affirming meanings, it is significantly because existing 
constitutional rules—including the abortion right—make women’s sexual 
and reproductive destinies more truly their own. These rationalizing 
logics, which link Title VII’s sex discrimination protections to 
constitutional sex discrimination rules, hold up across the expanse of Title 
VII sex discrimination law in ways Bostock does not spotlight. Title VII’s 
sex discrimination rules also ban pregnancy discrimination—a prohibition 
that has authoritatively been held to afford women the right to make 
pregnancy-related decisions, including abortion, for themselves, without 
suffering adverse consequences at work.62 
Much like Bostock, which voices its “deep[] concern[s] with” 
religious liberty only to stop short of manifesting their doctrinal 
implications in the case, Casey generates its spiritual outlook on the 
abortion right and then noticeably pumps the brakes on it.63 Casey 
declines to convert its spiritual outlook on abortion into First Amendment 
protections for it, and likewise refuses to rule religious and moral 
opposition to abortion out of bounds as a religious establishment problem. 
Nor, along similar lines, does Casey require the exercise of the abortion 
right to hinge on any spiritual test.64 Instead, abiding by established 
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
62. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw through PL 117-26 with the exception of
PL 116-283, Div. A, Title XVIII, which takes effect January 1, 2022); U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2015-1, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY 
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES § I.A.4.c, § I.A.4.c n.58 (2015). See also Doe v. C.A.R.S Prot. 
Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008). 
63. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. 
64. Casey does, however, recognize that the state has the authority, even prior to viability, to
legislate to ensure that the abortion choice is a thoughtful and meaningfully informed one. See Casey, 
505 U.S. at 881–87 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (discussing 24-hour waiting 
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traditions of liberal political constitutional discourse, Casey translates its 
spiritual outlook on abortion into publicly accessible secular terms that 
officially declare abortion to be a protected aspect of constitutional 
liberty.65 
Whether all this formally makes Casey’s spiritual pluralism, 
including its mystery-of-life language, legally binding as precedent or 
merely dictum remains an esoteric constitutional question of real interest 
and import. That question, however, need not be settled for Casey 
successfully to impart its spiritual teachings to future generations, 
including the justices who will soon be deciding abortion’s fate in Dobbs. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 
At a unique moment in American history—during “the critical World 
War II year of 1944”—Judge Learned Hand delivered a famous address 
to a large audience gathered in New York City’s Central Park.66  Those in 
attendance included “a large number of new citizens.”67 The topic of 
Judge Hand’s address was “the spirit of liberty.”68 In it, he shared aspects 
of his own faith in liberty as an ideal, one worthy of the heroic sacrifices 
Americans were making, some with their very lives, as part of the national 
war effort.69 
As his starting point, Judge Hand invoked a distinctively American 
“faith, a faith in a common purpose, a common conviction, a common 
period rule as an informed consent measure). If, on one level, this sounds merely like Casey is 
allowing the state to ensure that the conditions for autonomous decision-making obtain, it also, on 
another level, may be seen as holding space for meaningfully deliberative spiritual reflection and 
choice-making that comes from it. For some related discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S 
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153 
(1994). 
65. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 845–46, 851–53, 857–58. On public justification, see
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 CHI. L. REV. 765, 765–66 (1997) (describing 
public reason as “part of the idea of democracy itself” and explaining that “[c]itizens realize that they 
cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable 
comprehensive doctrines” and so “they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably 
give to one another when fundamental political questions are at stake,” and then proposing “that in 
public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens”). Casey’s translation of pro-life religious and moral 
positions into state interests is a similar expression of the point, if one that may be less thoroughgoing. 
66. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 189 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952) [hereinafter HAND PAPERS]. An 
account of the circumstances of the address and its aftermath is in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED 
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 469–73 (2011). 
67. Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 189. 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 191.
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devotion.”70 The practice of this faith did not involve liberty in its 
conventional terms, such as liberty as an “unbridled will” or the “freedom 
to do what one likes.”71 Rather, the liberty he put his stock in was an 
advanced, a mature, or what sounds like a judicial vision of liberty: liberty 
as empowered but still humble, self-restrained, moderate, and full of a 
sense of fellow-feeling and mutual respect in ways that might position 
Americans to realize common ends.72 Vital to the realization of this spirit 
of liberty was Judge Hand’s call to his audience—and the American 
people in a wider sense—to hold this spirit of liberty in their hearts and to 
manifest it through an active interest in understanding “the minds of other 
men and women” and to “weigh[] their interests alongside [their own] 
without bias.”73 
Expressed in terms of civic virtues, Judge Hand’s spirit of liberty 
refracted the judicial virtues famously part of his own judicial practice.74 
Clear-eyed, he appreciated the significance of the American people 
accepting—and choosing to live—the spirit of liberty as their creed. 
Where they chose not to, no court could force them. As he put it in another 
address from the same year, making a point that is sadly relevant today, 
given the deep, intense divides of American politics: “[A] society so riven 
that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save.”75 However 
accurate as prediction, there was Judge Hand, professing his public faith 
in the spirit of liberty—a faith that, for him, had religious bearings—while 
trying to give that spirit flight and a home in American hearts.76 
While the Supreme Court lacks the power to compel the American 
people’s embrace of the spirit of liberty as an article of civic faith, the 
Court, like Judge Hand did, nevertheless has its own virtues and practices 
to attend to when issuing its decisions. Through its “constant tending” of 
the nation’s laws, the Court must choose in those cases, like abortion, that 
70. Id. at 189. 
71. Id. at 190.
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. For some expression, see generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958 (1958).  
75. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1944), in 
HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 172, 181. Hand makes much the same point in different terms in his 
“The Spirit of Liberty” speech. See Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note 
66, at 190 (“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, 
no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. . . .”). 
76. For Judge Hand’s text’s suggestion of its religious underpinnings, see Hand, The Spirit of 
Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 190. Gerald Gunther’s biography of Judge Hand observes 
that while the address had “notable religious overtones, including an invocation of Jesus Christ,” 
Judge Hand was “for decades an agnostic[.]” GUNTHER, supra note 66, at 473. 
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implicate it, whether to exercise its authority so as to shore up or weaken 
the American people’s faith in the common endeavor of a republic of 
which we are all equal parts.77 
What will happen to this faith in Dobbs? Casey’s failure to forge an 
enduring peace among the contending sides in the ongoing battles over 
abortion is one thing. Perhaps Justice Gorsuch, because of how he may 
see and understand the different sides in Dobbs, will be positioned to offer 
a better account for good-faith acceptance of Casey’s longstanding rules 
than Casey itself did. In doing so, he might explain to the American people 
why accepting Casey, with its acceptance of Roe’s basics, still serves the 
common good of the republic that people want to keep—even if one 
believes Roe was wrongly decided at the outset. 
Whether he ventures this effort, consistent with the type of ruling his 
Bostock decision recommends, and with what effects on women’s equal 
citizenship stature and for the rule of law, is now Justice Gorsuch’s choice 
to make. 
77. GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 17, 21 (“Our blessings cannot be taken for granted and need
constant tending.”). One aspect of Casey’s reflection of the point is in Casey, 505 U.S. at 868: 
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time. 
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the 
rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their 
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases 
and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy should 
be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its 
constitutional ideals. The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, 
but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible. 
